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COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE:
RETURNING AUTHOR PROTECTIONS TO
THEIR RATIONAL ROOTS
Robert E. Shepard
Copyright protections encourage the production of intellectual
property by temporarily restricting free public access, a constitutional
design that Justice Stephen Breyer has called a “two-edged sword.”
Yet, the Copyright Clause really enshrines a triangular relationship
among authors, consumers, and commodifiers, a third constituency that
has always interposed itself between author-creators and consumer
end-users.
Though the Copyright Triangle is nothing new, a fundamental
reordering of these constituencies is in progress, with digital
commodifiers such as Google assuming a dominant role. Though they
sometimes proclaim themselves champions of free public access to
culture, these commodifiers have instead aggrandized themselves at the
expense of intellectual property creators and, ultimately, consumers,
damaging the Copyright Clause’s delicate balance of private
incentives.
This Note demonstrates how copyright law increasingly serves
the interests of a limited subset of commodifiers at the expense of
authors and the public. It shows how two recent Supreme Court
decisions that ostensibly benefited authors, Eldred v. Ashcroft and
Golan v. Holder, instead exacerbated this trend. The Note advocates
two fundamental changes to copyright laws that may help protect
authors’ rights in the expanding digital universe, and also protect the
public’s right to gain timely, free access to intellectual property. First,
Congress should allow authors to more rapidly reclaim the rights they
grant to third parties, such as publishers. Second, Congress should
dramatically reduce copyright durations for certain kinds of intellectual
property, including books, injecting these works into the public domain
more rapidly. These changes may not only bring equilibrium to the
three sides of the Copyright Triangle but also restore the grand bargain
enshrined in the Copyright Clause.

 J.D. May 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.A. and B.A., University of
Pennsylvania.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution confers
upon Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”1 A
close reading of the Clause suggests that it is a grand bargain seeking
to balance the interests of two parties: authors and inventors, on the
one hand, and the public on the other.2 The Clause’s genius is that it
establishes incentives for the creators of intellectual property, by
allowing them exclusive control over their works for a period of
time.3 At the same time, however, it provides a windfall of art,
science, and information to the public.4
Justice Stephen Breyer has observed that this dualistic structure
confers a “monopoly” on authors and is therefore a “two-edged
sword.”5 That is, while “encourag[ing] production of new works” by
deterring uncompensated copying, copyright also “tends to restrict
the dissemination (and use) of works once produced.”6 Copyright can
accomplish this effect either by driving retail prices upward or by
imposing additional “administrative costs” on users who want to
“find [a work’s] owner and strike a bargain.”7
Justice Breyer’s observation ignores a third set of parties: the
commodifiers of intellectual property who have always interposed
themselves between creators and consumer end-users. Over the long
history of the printed word, these have included printers, typesetters,

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Although the Clause speaks equally to the interests of authors and inventors, this Note is
concerned mainly with the rights of authors—especially authors of written works, and more
especially authors of books.
3. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (characterizing the Clause's
"economic philosophy" as "the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors").
4. Id. The Mazer Court went on to say: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." This oft-cited decision is
remembered in part for its holding that statuettes of dancing figures, used as bases for table
lamps, were protectable under copyright as “art.”
5. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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book publishers, wholesalers, and retail booksellers.8 But more
recently, this stratum of commodifiers—whose work is tied to the
mechanical reproduction and retail sale of books and other printed
and manufactured goods—has begun to give way to a new set of
digital publishers and information aggregators.9 These include search
engine providers, such as Google, that permit users to search the
complete texts of book-length works, viewing many pages at a time
without charge.10 Online retailers of books that are published in
digital media rather than printed and bound, such as Amazon and its
Kindle “ebooks,” have become significant players as well.11
With digitization has come a speeding of the time and a
streamlining of the mechanisms employed to get works from their
authors, photographers, composers, artists, and designers to the
ultimate end-user.12 Traditional commodifiers, such as book
publishers, still interpose themselves between authors and
consumers, but they must now share this increasingly crowded space
with newer entities that arose online.13 Moreover, book and “ebook”
retailers such as Amazon have begun to found their own publishing
divisions, thereby signaling a consolidation of both the editing and
digital and print manufacturing of books with the retailing business.14
Thus, Justice Breyer’s two-edged sword is better characterized
as a triangle: a three-way relationship among authors, consumers,
and commodifiers. This “Copyright Triangle” is nothing new. It had
its origins at least as early as Elizabethan England and gave rise to
8. For a useful overview of the evolution of the “commodifier” side of the Triangle from
early printers to booksellers to modern print and digital publishers, see Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Authorship Without Ownership: Reconsidering Incentives in A Digital Age, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 1121 (2003).
9. See generally Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (discussing Google’s efforts to digitize 12 million books to make available for online
searching without seeking copyright permission).
10. Id. Google has scanned more than 12 million books, of which millions were still under
copyright, and made them searchable online. Id.
11. PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, REVEALING THE BUSINESS OF EBOOKS: THE FOURTH ANNUAL
EBOOK SURVEY OF PUBLISHERS, APTARA CORP. (2012), http://ww3.aptaracorp.com/lp
/landingpages/4thebooksurveyregister.html (follow “Download the Survey Results & Analysis”
and complete registration form for free download).
12. See Julie Bosman, Writer’s Cramp: In the e-Reader Era, a Book a Year is Slacking,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/business/in-e-reader-age-ofwriters-cramp-a-book-a-year-is-slacking.html.
13. See Steve Wasserman, The Amazon Effect, THE NATION, May 29, 2012, http://
www.thenation.com/article/168125/amazon-effect#.
14. Id.

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

2014]

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

10/19/2014 10:51 AM

735

the very tensions among authors, printer–booksellers, and consumers
that resulted in the foundational document in Anglo−American
copyright law, the Statute of Anne (1710), which gave authors—and
not exclusively printer–booksellers—the right to copy their own
written works.15 The Statute is the direct antecedent of our
constitutional copyright protections and the federal copyright statutes
that have interpreted and expanded those protections for more than
two centuries.16
What is new, as this Note will argue, is a fundamental
reordering of the traditional roles these three parties—authors,
consumers, and commodifiers—have occupied along the sides of the
Triangle. At different times in copyright history, authors (by
asserting restrictions on the use and reuse of their work), consumers
(by asserting their right of access to knowledge and art) and
commodifiers (by asserting their critical role in moving intellectual
property from authors to consumers) have each been in the
ascendancy.17 Thus the Triangle is not always equilateral; it has often
been isosceles, with two sides of equal length and one side
disproportionately shorter. And in recent years—first as traditional
commodifiers asserted more and more authority at authors’ expense,
and then as these traditional entities began ceding ground to the new
class of digital commodifiers—authors have moved definitively to
the short side of the Triangle.
By facilitating the movement of intellectual property to
consumers at little to no cost without any apparent concern for
authors’ copyright protections, the new commodifiers have
challenged structures that helped compensate authors, however
imperfectly, or their creative works.18 Their arrival has also triggered

15. See RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 41–42 (2004).
16. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). For a more complete summary of the
Statute’s passage and its relation to the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution, see Golan v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900–01 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. See generally Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
“Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 501 (1991) (tracing, among other trends, continual shifts in
the idea and meaning of “authorship” since the period of the Statute of Anne, the relation of
authorship to the commodification of works, and the “remarkably congruent” interests of
consumers and copyright owners).
18. See Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 11, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 05 CV 8136-DC), 2011 WL 5905500. The plaintiffs, a
membership organization of authors and a representative class of individual authors, asserted that
Google’s alleged unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works damaged authors through, inter
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a new alliance between commodifiers and consumer end-users.19
Authors are aware of the ongoing weakening of their control over the
fruits of their labors yet continue to give ground.20 Copyright law
must be especially protective of authors’ rights at such a time, yet, as
this Note will show, it has instead been mainly protective of
commodifiers, whose interests increasingly diverge from those of
authors. Thus, it is important to explore what has upset the balance in
the Copyright Triangle, and how it can be restored.
Part II examines the two most prominent recent Supreme Court
decisions dealing with copyright, specifically copyright duration:
Eldred v. Ashcroft21 and Golan v. Holder.22 The Court presented
these decisions, which confirmed the durational extensions embodied
in the most recent revision of the Copyright Act, as benefiting
authors; however, their real effect, as Part III shows, was to
strengthen the position of certain intellectual property commodifiers,
notably movie studios, with little regard to the effects on authors. At
the same time, the expansion of the new class of digital
commodifiers further eroded the ability of authors to police the
integrity of their own copyrights, while making copyrighted material

alia, “depreciation in the value and ability to license and sell their Books,” lost profits, and
“damage to their goodwill and reputation.” Id.
19. See Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital
Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2451 (2001) (differentiating the “institutional
distribution regime” from digital distribution methods and asserting that “scholars and lawmakers
alike have failed to address the root of the problem, which is not that technology empowers the
public to flout copyright law with impunity, but instead that the public has no aversion to seizing
this opportunity”).
20. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), the most
recent case to erode author protections. In HathiTrust, the court upheld, largely on grounds that
the “fair use” defense was available to the defendants, the mass-scanning into digital form of
millions of books held by university libraries, without provision for royalty payments to the
authors of those works that were under copyright. Id. at 464. HathiTrust’s effects and meaning
will be discussed in Part III infra. See also Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132, 135
(2d Cir. 2013) (vacating the district court’s earlier class certification for a group of authors,
publishers, and other copyright holders and remanding for a determination of whether the
database company could assert a valid fair-use defense to mass copyright infringement). The
court noted that Google’s argument that the plaintiffs failed to represent the certified class “may
carry some force.” Id. at 134. James Grimmelman observed that “[i]f the case ever does manage
to reach the fair use merits, Google is now that likelier to get the same kind of sweeping fair-use
blessing that its library partners got in the HathiTrust decision.” James Grimmelman, Second
Circuit Decertifies the Google Books Class, THE LABORATORIUM (July 1, 2013, 11:30 AM),
http://laboratorium.net/archive/2013/07/01/second_circuit_decertifies_the_google_books_class.
21. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
22. 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
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available to consumers at little or no cost.23 Thus, as Part III
concludes, one fundamental goal of the Copyright Clause—
protecting authors so they could be encouraged to generate more
works to benefit society—was left unserved. Part IV concludes by
advocating two fundamental changes to copyright law that may help
protect authors’ rights in the newly expanding digital universe.
First, Congress should revise the most recent version of the
Copyright Act to allow authors to more quickly reclaim rights they
have temporarily granted to third parties, such as book publishers,
during the term of copyright. Second, Congress should reduce
copyright durations for certain kinds of works, including books—the
opposite of the inflationary trend that has resulted in a continuous
expansion of copyright durations since 1831. Reducing copyright
duration may seem counterintuitive as a means of protecting author
rights, yet may help restore a more traditional balance that has been
altered by the aggrandizement of commodifiers. Each of these
proposed policy changes points to one further philosophical
imperative: dispensing with the idea that all forms of copyrighted
works—from books to photographs to movies—must be treated
exactly the same, especially with respect to duration. There is no
such requirement under the Copyright Clause, and allowing authors
to reclaim rights in certain kinds of works, such as books, may
strengthen their position relative to commodifiers, like book
publishers, while reassuring others, notably movie studios, that have
tended to dictate the terms of copyright duration. By carrying out
these changes in its approach to copyright, and duration in particular,
Congress could restore balance to the three sides of the Copyright
Triangle. Authors will lose few of the protections copyright was
intended to bestow, commodifiers will maintain their rights to exploit
different kinds of works for appropriate periods of time, and
consumers will benefit from the passage of works into the public
domain at rational, rather than arbitrary, junctures. Copyright can
thus be modernized and rationalized with sensitivity to all players,
providing for a more equilateral Copyright Triangle.

23. See, e.g., Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 18, at 11 (in which
authors asserted that Google’s alleged copyright infringement depreciated the value of licensing
and selling their books and caused “damage to their goodwill and reputation.”).
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II. THE TROUBLED RECENT HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT DURATION
Eldred and Golan both arose in the wake of the most recent
revision of the Copyright Act, the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension
Act of 1978 (CTEA), and both focused on copyright duration.24 For a
variety of reasons, they perfectly illustrate both the tensions that exist
within the Copyright Triangle and the fallacy that lengthening
copyright duration is always the proper way to balance the
competing interests of authors, consumers, and commodifiers. This
Part demonstrates how CTEA, an ostensibly author-friendly
Copyright Act revision, actually disserves authors in a variety of
ways while serving the interests of commodifiers. The arguments
around Eldred and Golan also show how the centuries-old theoretical
underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, itself, came back to the fore
through these debates.
A. Eldred v. Ashcroft
Eldred v. Ashcroft arose as a direct result of Congress’s passage
of CTEA, which extended copyright protection until seventy years
after an author’s death, rather than the previous fifty years.25 By the
time Eldred was decided, CTEA had become widely known as the
“Mickey Mouse Protection Act,” both because the copyright
extension it embodied forestalled the Disney cartoon character from
entering the public domain in 2003 and because the Walt Disney Co.
had supposedly lobbied members of Congress to support its
passage.26
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her majority opinion in Eldred,
CTEA marked the fourth major extension of copyright duration since
the Copyright Act of 1790 codified Congress’s “limited Times”
power as a fourteen-year term, renewable once for an additional
fourteen years.27 In extending copyright terms by twenty years,
24. Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998). CTEA
extended copyright durations, in most cases, to the life of the author plus 70 years, superseding a
similar provision in the 1976 Copyright Act that had specified a duration of “life plus 50” years.
Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat. 2541,
2572 (1976).
25. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194–96. See also 17 U.S.C. § 302.
26. See Damien Cave, Mickey Mouse vs. The People, SALON (Feb. 21, 2002, 10:38 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2002/02/21/web_copyright/ (discussing interview with co-petitioners Eric
Eldred and Laura Bjorkland).
27. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194. The other three extensions came in 1831 (twenty-eight-year
initial copyright term, renewable for fourteen years); 1909 (twenty-eight-year initial term, now
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CTEA not only embraced a “life of the author plus 70 years”
duration for new works, but extended the copyright term in
anonymous and pseudonymous works to ninety-five years from the
work’s initial publication or 120 years from its creation, whichever
came first.28
Eldred, the named co-plaintiff, had been offering public-domain
works, such as novels by Nathaniel Hawthorne, free of charge on a
website since 1995.29 He claimed standing on the basis that CTEA’s
implementation would delay his web publication of certain works—
those that were about to enter the public domain when CTEA
extended their copyrights—for twenty years, violating, he argued,
not only the Copyright Clause but also the First Amendment.30 More
expansively, he asserted that “[w]hile formally, under each of these
extensions [of copyright, over time], the term is limited, the practice
of continually extending copyright retroactively means that
Congress, in effect, is granting copyright holders more than a
‘limited term.’”31
Eldred claimed that CTEA violated the Copyright Clause in two
ways: by conferring additional copyright “benefits” on authors
retroactively, which could not “promote the Progress of Science”
(especially if the author were already dead), and by extending many
copyrights to ninety-five years from the time of creation.32 This, he
argued, was “beyond any reasonable expectation of the life
expectancy of an author, since few authors begin creating works until
they are at least adolescents and since there are few, if any, authors
who have lived to an age exceeding 110 years.”33 He did not argue,
however, against the validity of granting the “life plus 70 years” term
to brand new works.34

renewable for a further twenty-eight years); and 1976 (abandoning the “publication-plus” formula
in favor of protection lasting, in most cases, until fifty years after the author’s death). Id. at
194–95.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1998).
29. Cave, supra note 26.
30. Complaint at para. 5, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F.Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No.
1:99CV00065), 1999 WL 33743484.
31. Id. at para. 34.
32. Id. at para. 35. The ninety-five-year term was for works in which copyright already
subsisted when the 1976 Act took effect. The corresponding term had been seventy-five years
before CTEA extended it. Id. at para. 33.
33. Id. at para. 35
34. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003).
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In effect, Eldred asserted that Congress had conferred a benefit
upon authors, in the form of extended copyright duration, without
asking for anything in return.35 Implicit in Eldred’s original
complaint—and made more explicit by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court—was the idea that the Framers had intended the
Copyright Clause to demand a quid pro quo: Congress would grant
authors copyright protection for a “limited Time” in exchange for
their working to “promote the Progress of Science.”36 As Eldred’s
brief noted, the first Congress had built this inherent “requirement of
an exchange” into the Copyright Act of 1790.37 In fact, as Eldred
noted, the Act had really foreseen two different sets of exchanges.
One was Congress’s conferral of copyright protection on authors for
limited times, in return for the author’s generation of “new
production”: works that could benefit the public.38 Eldred’s
complaint also described the second exchange Congress had foreseen
in 1790: “In exchange for a new federal right, the author or
proprietor would abandon his common law or state statutory right.”39
The matter of this second exchange was an unusual one to raise
in the late 1990s, but it had, indeed, been front and center when the
Founders framed the Copyright Clause,40 and it gained new
relevance in the context of modern authors’ rights. It had been
enunciated both before and after the British Parliament’s adoption of
the Statute of Anne in 1710, and it was still being debated when the
foundational case in American copyright law, Wheaton v. Peters,

35. See Complaint, supra note 30, at para. 30–35.
36. Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 11–12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No.
01-618), 2002 WL 31039334.
37. Id. at 4–5.
38. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 903 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
39. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 36, at 5.
40. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 238 (James Madison) (Chicago, Scott, Foresman & Co.
1898) (“The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copy right of authors has been
solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at common law.”). But see Edward C.
Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Anatomy of a
Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1, 33 (2003) (“[A]n argument could be—and indeed was—made
that . . . the constitutional language was intended to protect existing property rights in both
writings and invention. Read superficially and without reference to other contemporaneous views
expressed by him, Madison's comments in The Federalist No. 43 could indeed be taken as
supporting this view. But when the issue was presented to the Supreme Court in 1834 in Wheaton
v. Peters, it chose to interpret the meaning given to ‘securing’ in quite a different light, namely, as
merely a grant of authority to Congress to create a right.”).
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reached the Supreme Court in 1834, seemingly settling the matter.41
Now it was back before the Court.
The “common law” right that authors, according to Eldred, had
abandoned in exchange for “a new federal right” was the right to a
perpetual copyright.42 But the Wheaton Court had dismissed the
existence of such a perpetual right, emphasizing that when it passed
the Copyright Act of 1790, Congress “instead of sanctioning an
existing perpetual right in an author in his works, created the right
secured for a limited time by the provisions of that law.”43 Moreover,
Justice John McLean wrote,
The word secure, as used in the [C]onstitution, could not
mean the protection of an acknowledged legal right. It
refers to inventors, as well as authors: and it had never been
pretended by any one, either in this country or in England,
that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law, to
sell the thing invented.44
Thus, according to the Wheaton Court, the Framers had no
illusion that a common law copyright existed; it did not, and
Congress in 1790 created a statutory copyright out of whole cloth.45
Commentators have differed on the Framers’ real intent in
imposing a “limited” duration on copyright. Melville and David
Nimmer enunciate the dominant view that “the authorization to grant
to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is predicated
upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the creative
activities of authors; and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary
condition to the full realization of such creative activities.”46 Other
41. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Wheaton had claimed infringement of
his copyright in his multivolume set of Supreme Court opinions, the precursor to modern
reporters. Id. at 595. Peters, his competitor, denied any infringing activity and asserted that
Wheaton had no copyright to begin with, because he had failed to comply with certain statutory
formalities. Id. After losing the case, Wheaton lived to see the opinion published by his rival and
opponent, Peters. Craig Joyce, "A Curious Chapter in the History of Judicature": Wheaton v.
Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 386
(2005).
42. But see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1-2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02
(2012) & 3-9 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.09, n.11.2 (2012) (describing the exceptional—and
exceedingly few—circumstances in which a vestige of common law copyright persists in the
United States).
43. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 592.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1-1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2012).
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scholars of copyright history, however, conclude that the Framers did
not intend to use copyright as a spur to creativity, but rather to
“vindicate any natural right the author may have to compensation for
the product of his labor.”47 If so, then there was no logic to Eldred’s
complaint that Congress should have demanded a new creative quid
pro quo of authors before conferring longer copyright durations on
existing works.48 Congress could determine the best way to “promote
progress” however it saw fit.49
Before petitioning for certiorari, Eldred had lost his case both at
trial and on appeal, but the dissenting judge in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sounded a note
of alarm that required an answer when Eldred arrived at the Supreme
Court:
[T]here is no apparent substantive distinction between
permanent protection and permanently available authority
to extend originally limited protection. The Congress that
can extend the protection of an existing work from 100
years to 120 years can extend that protection from 120 years
to 140; and from 140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in
effect can accomplish precisely what the majority admits it
cannot do directly.50
That is, if Congress could extend copyright in increments, and
seemingly without limit, it could functionally restore the discredited
idea of a perpetual copyright arising at common law.
The response to that argument, according to the Eldred Court,
was that prospective claims about what Congress might be up to
were beside the point, and CTEA’s twenty-year extension of
copyright was fully compliant with the Copyright Clause’s “limited
Times” requirement.51 Moreover, the majority asserted, the
durational expansion had been a “rational exercise” of congressional
authority under the Copyright Clause, because Congress faced an
urgent imperative: harmonizing U.S. copyright durations with those
47. Thomas Nachbar, Constructing Copyright’s Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 37, 42 (2002).
Nachbar argues that the “quid pro quo theory of copyright” is a modern construct contradicted by
state copyright statutes, drafted at roughly the same time as the Constitution, that invoked authors
“natural rights” as the true justification for copyright. Id. at 44.
48. See id. at 41–43.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
51. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).
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imposed under the Berne Convention and more recent European
Union directives, which had set duration at life of the author plus
seventy years.52
But what of the other exchange implicit in copyright law:
granting authors copyright protection in exchange for their creation
of new work? The Eldred majority rejected the plaintiffs’ contention
(as the Court characterized it) that such promotion had to be the sole
objective of extending existing copyright terms.53 Instead, the
majority reasoned that extending copyright durations by decades
served the Copyright Clause’s goals by “spurring the creation and
publication of new expression” as well as protecting the public’s
access to “facts and ideas.”54 The bottom line was that longer
copyright durations, such as those embodied in CTEA, “protect
authors’ original expression from unrestricted exploitation.”55
However, the Court offered no evidence for its reasoning that longer
terms were compatible with the Copyright Clause’s goal of
promoting “new expression.”56
B. Golan v. Holder
Like Eldred, Golan v. Holder arose partly in the context of
harmonizing United States law with the nation’s international treaty
commitments. In Golan, a group of “orchestra conductors, educators,
performers, film archivists, and motion picture distributors” sued the
United States, claiming harm from United States adherence to the
Uruguay Round of international trade agreements, which obligated
the United States to place certain public domain works originally
published outside the United States under copyright protection.57 The
obligation arose when the United States signed the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in
1994.58 TRIPS had, for the first time, imposed penalties on signatory
nations that failed to comply with Berne.59 Congress now saw no
52. Id. at 204–05. The original 1976 Act had accomplished harmonization with Berne’s “life
plus 50” regime, but not with the subsequent EU extension of duration. Id. at 193.
53. Id. at 211–12.
54. Id. at 219–20.
55. Id. at 221.
56. Id. at 218–19.
57. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 12–13, Golan v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2005)
(No. 05-1259), 2005 WL 2673976.
58. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878–81 (2012).
59. Id. at 881.
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choice but to “restore” copyright protection to these works, and did
so through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994.60
The Berne Convention had been the principal international
treaty governing copyright relations since 1886, but the U.S. did not
become a signatory until 1989.61 Previously, Congress had provided
copyright protection to works first published abroad only when their
countries of origin maintained reciprocal trade relations with the
United States.62 When Congress finally ratified Berne in 1989, it
initially ignored the Convention’s requirement that it extend
copyright protection to all works that were still under copyright
protections in their countries of origin.63 Consequently, works that
were protected abroad—but which had never enjoyed copyright
protection in the United States—remained in the public domain in
the United States, leaving them available for free exploitation.64 In
effect, TRIPS created an enforcement mechanism for Berne that
Congress could not avoid.
The Golan musicians and conductors claimed that their ability to
publicly perform musical works would be impeded if sheet music
previously in the public domain were suddenly placed under
copyright protection and made subject to royalty payments.65
Composers, similarly, asserted that works they had written to include
selections of other composers’ works would be barred from public
performance, since the underlying works—which had been in the
public domain when the newer works were composed—would now
be subject to copyright protection.66 For example, a high school band
instructor who had composed a piece of music quoting selections
from a symphony by Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich would
60. 18 Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 514, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2004). Although
copyright “restoration” became shorthand for placing works under copyright protection that had
formerly been in the public domain, most were not being “restored” to U.S. copyright protection,
never having enjoyed it previously. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 882 & n.13. There were three reasons for
the initial lack of protection: the U.S. and the origin country did not maintain reciprocal copyright
relations at the time the work was published; the foreign creator did not follow U.S. copyright
formalities in place at the time, such as placing a printed copyright notice in the work; or the work
in question was a sound recording, a format that was not covered by U.S. copyright protections
until 1972. Id. at 881–82.
61. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 877.
62. Id. at 879.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 57, at 14.
66. Id. at 16.
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be barred from publicly performing his own “derivative” work,
because the Shostakovich selections were given copyright protection
after the band instructor wrote his “derivative” work.67 Berne
penalties or not, the Golan plaintiffs argued that Congress did not
have the authority to remove works from the public domain, because
the Copyright Clause applied protections only to newly created
works.68
A second argument focused squarely on the duration of
copyright protections, asserting that CTEA’s “life plus 70” standard
granted such a long period of copyright protection that it could not be
considered a “limited Time” at all, as the Copyright Clause
demanded.69 Under the Golan plaintiffs’ theory, Congress had not
only removed works from the public domain but had placed them
under “effectively perpetual” copyright protection, which it could
extend again and again at will.70
It was not an easy argument to make, as the Golan plaintiffs
acknowledged, both because the governing law did specify a
statutorily finite copyright term (albeit a very long one) and because
the Court had seemingly foreclosed the “effectively perpetual”
argument in Eldred.71 And, indeed, once again writing for the
majority and referring to her earlier opinion, Justice Ginsburg
rejected the “effectively perpetual” argument once more.72 The
Copyright Clause, the Golan Court reasoned, did not preclude
Congress from imposing a copyright term on works that had not
fallen under copyright before, any more than it prohibited Congress
from adding years to an existing copyright term.73
Moreover, the majority observed, permitting Congress this kind
of latitude did not suggest that it could one day create “perpetual”
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 21. The appellants cited as authority Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6
(1966), which held that public domain inventions could not be placed under patent protection
retroactively. The same rule that governed patents should apply to copyright, they argued, since
Congress’s authority over both arose in the Copyright Clause. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra
note 57, at 21.
69. Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 57, at 22.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 884–85 (2012).
73. Id. at 885. Viewed another way, the Golan petitioners had asserted, when a work lay in
the public domain it essentially had a copyright term of “zero”; therefore, placing the work under
CTEA’s copyright protection would effectively lengthen the term from zero years to seven
decades or more. Id.
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copyright protection, simply by extending copyright terms over and
over.74 Yet the Court did not say why this “hypothetical” case was so
far-fetched; instead, Justice Ginsburg chose to highlight the benefits
of harmonizing U.S. copyright protections with those afforded by
treaty partners.75 “In aligning the United States with other nations . . .
and thereby according equitable treatment to once disfavored foreign
authors,” she wrote, “Congress can hardly be charged with a design
to move stealthily toward a regime of perpetual copyrights.”76
Yet, however admirable it was to align U.S. copyright
protections with those of America’s Berne co-signatories, Congress
had been moving steadily, if not “stealthily,” toward the vanishing
point of “perpetual” protection for decades.77 Neither the majority
opinion in Eldred nor its counterpart in Golan, moreover, stated just
who would benefit from longer copyright terms, or how. While
Eldred had nominally disfavored an early Internet information
aggregator in the guise of allowing authors longer copyright terms it
offered no clear evidence of how authors might benefit from CTEA’s
durational extension.78 The Golan majority seemed to step back from
the need for any incentive toward authors at all, endorsing the
“dissemination” of works as a valid means of fulfilling the Copyright
Clause mandate to “promote science.”79 No new “creation” was
necessary.80 In effect, as Part III81 explores, those with the power to
“disseminate” information were, for the first time, being placed on
par with authors and the public as copyright’s intended beneficiaries.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 875–76.
76. Id.
77. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194–95 (2003) (tracing the series of
increases in copyright duration beginning with the Copyright Act of 1790 and concluding with
the CTEA). Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, nonetheless reasoned that CTEA’s
copyright terms, “though longer than the 1976 Act’s terms, are still limited, not perpetual.” Id. at
186.
78. Id. at 187.
79. See Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888.
80. Id.
81. See infra Part III.
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III. THE UNSUNG BENEFICIARIES OF LONGER COPYRIGHT DURATION
A. Enter the Commodifiers (Quietly): The Entertainment
Industry as “Author”
In some ways, Golan and Eldred were remarkable not for what
they had to say about copyright duration, but for what they left out,
such as who stood to benefit the most from extending copyright
terms. But Justice Breyer, who dissented in both decisions, lost no
time in identifying the real beneficiaries:
The economic effect of this 20 year extension . . . is to make
the copyright term not limited but virtually perpetual. Its
primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to
authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors.
And most importantly, its practical effect is not to promote,
but to inhibit, the progress of “Science” by which words the
Framers meant learning or knowledge.82
Justice Breyer suggested that focusing on America’s treaty
obligations—or possible trade imbalances if Congress failed to
match the European Union copyright terms—was a red herring.83
“European and American copyright law have long coexisted despite
important differences,” he observed.84 More than two decades had
passed since the U.S. adjusted its copyright law to conform to
Berne’s “life of the author plus” structure for computing copyright
term.85 Europe’s adoption of the even longer “life plus seventy”
standard did not require a like response; it was merely a matter of
“European institutional considerations” following that continent’s
consolidation.86
Leaving treaty harmonization aside, Justice Breyer also rejected
the majority’s alternate rationale for extending copyright durations:
providing incentives “to those who act as publishers to republish and
to redistribute older copyrighted works.”87 This justification could
not be valid, Justice Breyer opined, because it ran counter to the
Framers’ view that “it is the disappearance of the monopoly grant,
not its perpetuation, that will, on balance, promote the dissemination
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See id. at 259.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

748

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/19/2014 10:51 AM

[Vol. 47:731

of works already in existence.”88 Far from serving the needs of
authors or the public, CTEA’s extended durations seemed to serve
only a “uniquely publisher-related rationale.”89 Congress’s attempt to
provide incentives for the “dissemination” of existing work, rather
than the creation of new work, was “constitutionally perverse.”90
Justice Breyer found a more likely explanation for CTEA’s
durational change in the Act’s legislative history, which “refers
frequently to the financial assistance the statute will bring the
entertainment industry, particularly through the promotion of
exports.”91 At congressional committee hearings leading up to
CTEA’s passage, corporate spokespeople and trade association
executives—especially from the music and film industries—had
testified to the need for copyright term extensions to maintain
industry competitiveness abroad.92 Many invoked the need to protect
authors’ livelihoods before turning to the industries’ own concerns;
however, they refrained from going into great specifics about what
authors could be expected to suffer without the durational changes:
an old trope.93
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s chairman, Sen. Orrin Hatch
of Utah, opened the hearing of September 20, 1995 in typical
fashion, declaring that Congress sought to bestow benefits on authors
when, in reality, commodifiers were the proposed legislation’s main
beneficiaries.94 “Our trading partners in Europe have recently
established the goal to move the minimum copyright term . . . to life
plus 70,” Hatch testified.95 “If we do not adopt the same rule, our
creators will not reap the benefit of this new international
standard.”96 Written works were property, Hatch told the committee,
and he “[came] to the conclusion that, like most property owners, the
vast majority of authors expect their copyrights to be a potentially
valuable resource to be passed on to their children and through them
88. Id.
89. Id. at 261.
90. Id. at 262.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Senate Hearing].
93. See Christopher Ledford, The Dream that Never Dies: Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Author,
and the Search for Perpetual Copyright, 84 OR. L. REV. 655, 656 (2005).
94. Senate Hearing, supra note 92 (opening statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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to the succeeding generation.”97 But copyrights often expired “before
even the first generation of an author’s heirs have fully benefited
from them.”98 Particularly since Americans were enjoying longer life
spans and marrying and having children later, Hatch continued, “life
plus 50” copyright terms threatened to prematurely cut off the
birthright of generations of authors’ offspring.99 Failing to lengthen
copyright terms might also doom “perishable” works, such as old
movies, to crumble rather than being preserved through
digitization.100 Or, Hatch asserted, such films might have to be
preserved at taxpayer expense, when lengthening copyright terms
might allow “private parties” to fund preservation efforts, instead.101
The next speaker, Register of Copyright Marybeth Peters, partly
tempered Hatch’s prediction, admitting that it was “difficult to see
how moving from a term of life-plus-50 to life-plus-70 will
encourage authors to write.”102 Nonetheless, she agreed with Sen.
Hatch’s assertion that “bringing our law into conformity with the
longer copyright terms enjoyed by authors of other nations” would
justify passage.103
Authors, however, would not be the only or, necessarily, the
primary beneficiaries of the proposed longer copyright duration.
Christopher Ledford has observed that commodifiers have regularly
claimed to be serving the rights and needs of authors when arguing
for longer copyright durations that actually serve their own interests:
When authors’ and media corporations’ interests diverge
and one group’s position must yield, even on the rare
occasion when the latter does not triumph, the media
corporations’ interests are hardly dampened. Ultimately, the
moments of authorial supremacy serve mainly to illustrate
the manner in which perceived advances by authors are
deflected or minimized while media interests acquire and
retain tremendous benefits through their association with
authors.104
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright).
Id.
Ledford, supra note 93, at 660.
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One of the hearing’s most prominent speakers spoke frankly
about the real beneficiaries of copyright extension. After dismissing
“the thickets of . . . arcane academic issues that float around this,”
Motion Picture Association of America President Jack Valenti
identified the reasons underlying his organization’s support for
CTEA: “The copyright industries in this country—that includes
computer software and music and books, television, movies, and
home video—do about $45 billion a year abroad.”105 These
industries, Valenti said, would be “at a distinct disadvantage” in
competing with their European counterparts if the U.S. maintained
shorter copyright terms than Europe.106 “The revenues that would
come back to the American copyright owner now are truncated and
are diverted into European and other hands,” Valenti told the
senators.107
Valenti’s written statement went even further in analyzing the
supposed deleterious effects of shorter copyright terms. Valenti
wrote that, contrary to the claims of academics—who argued that
works enjoyed wider dissemination once they entered the public
domain—“[w]hatever work is not owned is a work [in which no one
would] invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer
an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can
offer for sale.”108 It was a curious argument, coming at a time when
digitization was beginning to make the preservation of intellectual
property all the more feasible.109 Taken as a whole, however,
Valenti’s in-person testimony and written statement were notable for
their focus on industries rather than on authors as the true
beneficiaries of longer copyright terms. They also announced the
conjoined interests of the other two parties to the Copyright Triangle:
consumers and commodifiers.110

105. Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 40 (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion
Picture Association of America).
106. Id. at 41.
107. Id. at 40.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Cf. The Digital Age Promised Vast Libraries, but They Remain Incomplete, ECONOMIST,
(Apr. 28, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21553410 (tracing the recent history of digital
preservation efforts and the relative ease of preservation efforts in mechanical terms, but also
highlighting significant remaining legal roadblocks to preservation).
110. Senate Hearing, supra note 92, at 42 (statement of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion
Picture Association of America).
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The Congress can, without any harm to the consumers,
magnify the revenue reach of copyright owners, and thereby
help, perhaps modestly, but help nonetheless, in the
reduction of our trade deficit . . . The Congress must equip
American owners of intellectual property with a full
measure of protection, else competition, in Europe
particularly, becomes skewed and U.S. copyright owners
are reduced in their reach and their effectiveness.111
In movie industry terms, the import of “copyright owners” was clear:
at least at the level of major motion pictures and network television
broadcasts, the copyright “owner” was the studio, not the
screenwriter, the director, or the author of the underlying book.112
Justice Breyer, suspicious that the needs of authors were lost in
such discussions, characterized this assertion of commodifiers’
competitive interests as a proper exercise of Congress’s commerce
power rather than of its copyright power.113 And he again turned to
the constitutional imperative to foster new creativity in authors—not
the dissemination of older work by corporate grantees—when he
addressed copyright duration in his dissent in Golan.114 Copyright
was supposed to benefit “the writer who has not yet written a book,
the musician who has not yet composed a song” by providing
incentives for creative output, Justice Breyer wrote.115 “When a
copyright law is primarily backward looking the risk is greater that
Congress is trying to help known beneficiaries at the expense of
badly organized unknown users who find it difficult to argue and
present their case to Congress.”116 The same issues, Justice Breyer
noted, had been at work when Parliament, attempting to rein in the
“monopoly” control of the British book business by printerbooksellers in the early 18th century, vested copyright in authors
rather than publishers through the Statute of Anne.117 The
“utilitarian” objective embodied in that statute and “embraced by
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 420 (1984)
(holding that the sale of home video recorders did not infringe copyrights in movies and
television programs, which were held by two movie studios).
113. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 262 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
114. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 909 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 907.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 901.
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Jefferson and Madison” was clear: authors’ rights in their work were
not meant to be gratuitous but to “advance public welfare” and “elicit
new creation.”118 Conferring new rights on movie studios, record
labels, and other corporate interests by extending copyright
protections on works that already existed did not benefit “authors”
and might restrict the dissemination of intellectual property.119 These
two results were the exact reverse of the Copyright Clause’s stated
intentions.
B. The Triangle Evolves: The Information Industry
Aligns with Consumers
Though the movie industry and record labels claimed to speak
for authors when they supported longer copyright terms in the 1976
Act and CTEA, Justice Breyer observed that these terms did not
benefit authors in most cases.120 In fact, Congressional Research
Service statistics showed that “only about 2% of copyrights can be
expected to retain commercial value at the end of 55 to 75 years.”121
Justice Breyer already had ample experience with such figures. In a
1970 article, in which he assessed early proposals to adopt the Berne
Convention’s “life of the author plus 50” durational standard, he had
concluded that only 1 percent of published works remained in print
at the end of the then-prevailing fifty-six-year copyright term.122
These figures suggested that authors stood little to gain
financially from longer copyright terms. The same fact had been
recognized decades earlier when Congress debated the 1909
Copyright Act’s proposed extension of copyright renewal terms
beyond fourteen years, or even adopting a “life plus thirty years”
formula.123 In debates leading to the 1909 Act’s passage, Congress
heard testimony that most authors never bothered to renew
118. Id. at 899–900 (internal citations omitted).
119. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 254–63 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(providing reasons for the lack of support the Copyright Term Extension Act offers to authors and
the general circulation of intellectual property).
120. Id. at 267–68.
121. Id. (citing EDWARD RAPPAPORT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-144 E, COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION: ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES (1998)). Justice Breyer clarified that “retain
commercial value” meant that the works would “still generate royalties after that time.” Id. at
248.
122. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 324 (1970).
123. See H.R. REP. NO. 59-7083, at 13 (1907) (testimony of Rep. Frank D. Currier).
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copyrights after the initial twenty-eight-year copyright period, which
allowed 95 percent of works to pass into the public domain.124 As
Breyer now pointed out, commodifiers—specifically the
“entertainment industry”—might benefit from longer copyright terms
even though authors would not, earning “higher corporate profits” by
continuing to exploit rights that authors had granted to commodifiers
years before.125
Congress’s willingness to use copyright to serve the interests of
commodifiers such as movie studios did not automatically
disenfranchise authors. But the Court’s announcement that the
Copyright Clause could be used purely to benefit the dissemination
of existing works, rather than the creation of new ones, heralded a
new aggrandizement of commodifiers at the potential expense of
authors and the public.126 It also came just as a new cohort of
commodifiers doing business on the Internet, and outside the
traditional structures of the publishing and entertainment industries,
began to assert their rights in ways that potentially damaged authors’
rights.
These were entities such as Google that did not depend on
creative works such as books and movies to generate their corporate
profits, but were instead engaged in the movement of information
and intellectual property from point to point.127 They thus did not
depend on grants of rights by authors, such as those that authors had
made to book publishers or that screenwriters had made to movie
producers.128 Instead, they could serve as toll collectors in the
information “superhighway,” earning revenues both from advertising
and from the sale of information they accumulated about Internet
users.129 Their primary stake was in having “information” available
124. Id. at 14.
125. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 262–63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. See Stacy F. McDonald, Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of Intellectual
Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 HOW. L.J. 541, 544
(2007) (arguing that “commodification of intellectual property distorts the copyright balance by
valuing a copyrighted work for its market potential over, above, and to the exclusion of its noneconomic values”).
127. See Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 479, 480–83 (2011).
128. Id. at 481.
129. Id. at 508–10 (Google “makes the overwhelming majority of its revenues from searchrelated advertising” but seeks additional revenue stream through the sale of scanned, searchable
“snippets” of book texts and “non-display uses” of book contents). See also Hannibal Travis,
Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L.
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to furnish to users; far from claiming to act on behalf of the
information’s “creators” or publishers, in fact, Google claimed to
provide access to information on an impartial basis.130
These new commodifiers had arisen in an online environment
that emphasized the democratizing power of the public domain and
the idea, first articulated by the Internet pioneer Stewart Brand, that
“information wants to be free.”131 By his own description, Brand’s
original quote, offered at the first Hackers’ Conference, in 1984, was
as follows:
On the one hand information wants to be expensive,
because it’s so valuable. The right information in the right
place just changes your life. On the other hand, information
wants to be free, because the cost of getting it out is getting
lower and lower all the time. So you have these two fighting
against each other.132
Brand offered a prescient revision of this statement three years
later, foreshadowing the realignment of authors, consumers, and
commodifiers that was to take place once the Internet became a
fixture of household life:
Information wants to be free. Information also wants to be
expensive. Information wants to be free because it has
become so cheap to distribute, copy, and recombine—too
cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be
immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension will
not go away. It leads to endless wrenching debate about
price, copyright, “intellectual property,” [and] the moral
rightness of casual distribution, because each round of new
devices makes the tension worse, not better.133
REV. 87, 92–93 (noting authors’ and publishers’ concern that Google intended “to sell advertising
in connection with previews of copyrighted books”).
130. See Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS, http://investor.google
.com/corporate/faq.html (last visited July 7, 2013) (noting that the search engine’s primary focus
is “on improving the ways people connect with information,” that “Google primarily generates
revenue by delivering relevant, cost-effective online advertising,” and that “[w]e will do our best
to provide the most relevant and useful search results possible, independent of financial
incentives).
131. See Stewart Brand, Information Wants to be Free, STEWART BRAND, http://sb
.longnow.org/SB_homepage/Info_free_story.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
132. Id.
133. Id. At his website, Brand cites this version of his own statement to his book, THE MEDIA
LAB (1987).
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Once the Internet came into wide use by consumers, legal
disputes involving this new means of disseminating copyrighted
material were inevitable. The rise of file-sharing over the Internet
also threatened traditional commodifiers such as movie studios,
record labels, and book publishers.134 One of the first high-profile
cases arose in the setting of the music industry.135
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.136 weighed whether a “peerto-peer” file-sharing service that allowed users to search, store, and
share digital music files infringed copyright.137 After several record
companies sued, Napster asserted in its defense that users’ copying
and sharing of files constituted “fair use” under the Copyright Act
for any of three reasons: because the sharing was temporary; because
users were merely sharing files that they had already legally
purchased; or because, in some cases, musical groups had consented
to allow their songs to appear on Napster free of charge.138 The court,
however, concluded that the fair use defense was inoperative where
the plaintiff could prove “present or future market harm” and that
both forms of harm were present.139
Critics of Napster and a subsequent case finding infringement
involving peer-to-peer networks, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Grokster,140 have argued that such decisions gave too much control
to content providers (record labels in Napster and movie studios in
Grokster) and too little to the consumer-propelled market forces the
Internet had unleashed.141 These cases did not represent the last word
on the role of Internet-based commodifiers in facilitating the
movement of copyrighted material to consumers without the
payment of royalties to authors. Arguably, however, they did play a
role in building consumer perceptions that web-based file-sharing
sites, search engines, and similar services were allies in the “free”
134. See Ledford, supra note 93, at 674.
135. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1010–11.
138. See id. at 1014.
139. Id. at 1016–17.
140. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
141. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE
MIND 82 (2008) (“The Internet is safe now . . . because it developed so fast that it was a reality
before people had time to be afraid of it. But it should give us pause that if we had our current
guiding set of policy goals in place, our assumption that cheaper copying means we need greater
regulation, we would never have allowed it to flourish.”).
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movement of “information” and that traditional commodifiers and
authors were the enemy.142 In this conception of the new digital
landscape, book publishers, record labels, movie studios, and other
traditional commodifiers, allied with authors, sought to “enclose” the
information commons in ways reminiscent of late-feudal attitudes
toward physical property and were arrayed against forces that sought
the healthy expansion of the public domain.143
It was in this continuing charged atmosphere that a federal court
recently handed down a decision with potentially damaging effects
for both book authors and traditional book publishers—and a
concomitant liberating effect for online commodifiers of material in
copyrighted books.144 The unexpected district court ruling in Authors
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust145 concerned the right of a non-profit
organization serving the blind to freely disseminate digital copies of
ten million published works, even though seventy-three percent of
them were under copyright protection.146 The principal defendant,
HathiTrust Digital Library, planned to make the books available to
the blind in such a way that they could easily be read, annotated, and
navigated online.147 However, HathiTrust and five university-library
co-defendants had also reached an agreement with Google that gave
Google exclusive rights to make the books available for viewing by
the general public (albeit in “snippets”) on its Google Books
service.148 In return, the libraries received digital copies of each
scanned work.149 A subset of “orphan” works—whose copyright
142. Ledford, supra note 93, at 674 (“The generational notion of entertainment or information
as properly acquired for free is a major blow to the copyrighted industries. Thus, as distribution
becomes less controllable, the focus on the author may in the long run prove to bite back at the
corporations. If all legitimacy resides in the author, there is little reason to feel a moral obligation
to pay the distributor.”).
143. See BOYLE, supra note 141, at 43–46 (arguing that a “second enclosure movement”
seeks to wall off the “intellectual commons” in a fashion similar to the “enclosure” of private real
estate in 15th to 19th century England). But see David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain,
50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 144 (2009) for the contrasting view that “contrary to many commentators'
claims, the biggest problem the public domain faces is not property-like rule structures in
copyright law, but the lack of them.”
144. 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 448.
147. Id. at 449.
148. Id. at 448.
149. Id. The five libraries were those of the Universities of Michigan, California, Wisconsin,
Indiana University, and Cornell University. Id. at 447. Indiana did not participate in the Orphan
Works Project. Id. at 449.
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owners are unknown—would be listed on a website for ninety
days.150 If the owners failed to emerge after that time, those works
would become available free of charge to HathiTrust’s users as well
as to library users.151
The Authors Guild, a membership organization representing
U.S. authors, joined by its counterparts from Canada, Australia,
Norway, and a separate group of individual plaintiffs, sued both
HathiTrust and Google in separate actions.152 In their action against
HathiTrust, plaintiffs alleged that the arrangements made between
the two companies violated provisions of the Copyright Act
governing exclusive reproduction rights of authors and copying by
libraries.153 Plaintiffs sought, inter alia, an injunction barring
HathiTrust and its co-defendants from providing the covered works
to Google for digitization unless the copyright holders authorized
such uses.154 The district court, however, granted HathiTrust’s
motion for summary judgment.155 It held that the “Fair Use” doctrine
provided a complete defense for the libraries.156 Significantly, the
court found that the doctrine applied, in part, because the purpose
and character of the use of the works—a key factor courts weigh in
applying the fair-use defense to copyright infringement—was
“transformative” in nature.157 “The use to which the works . . . are
put is transformative,” the court reasoned, “because the copies serve
an entirely different purpose than the original works: the purpose is
superior search capabilities rather than actual access to copyrighted
material.”158 Moreover, the judge concluded, the authors had failed
to show that the libraries’ and Google’s scanning activities, and
HathiTrust’s dissemination159—a factor that had been key in
Napster—would damage authors’ ability to fully exploit their works,

150. Id. at 449.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 447; Author’s Guild Inc., v. Google, Inc. 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
153. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
154. Id. at 449 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 (2002), 108 (2005)). The claim for injunctive relief
did, however, carve out a limited exception for use by the libraries for non-commercial purposes.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 108).
155. Id. at 447.
156. Id. at 464.
157. Id. at 460.
158. Id. The court also found the use transformative on the separate ground that provision of
the works to the blind was not among the works’ originally envisioned uses. Id. at 461.
159. Id. at 462–63.

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

758

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/19/2014 10:51 AM

[Vol. 47:731

including by licensing them.160 The HathiTrust court largely brushed
aside the Ninth Circuit’s observation in Napster that “lack of harm to
an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the
right to develop alternative markets for the works.”161 Instead, it
dismissed this possibility as “conjecture” and reasoned that use of the
works in an existing, transformative fashion effectively immunized
the defendants against claims of harm to future markets.162
HathiTrust suddenly cast into doubt the outcome of the related
class action lawsuit by authors against Google, again with the
Authors Guild as lead plaintiff, which had dragged on without
resolution since 2005.163 And it followed by only a month another
ruling that seemed to spell defeat for authors and book publishers
and victory for a major online commodifier: in this case, Amazon.164
In United States v. Apple, Inc.,165 the United States Justice
Department sued the technology company and the nation’s five
largest book publishers, claiming that they had engaged in a
price-fixing scheme to sell books via Apple’s iBookstore service.166
In entering its final judgment against the publishers, the court
required the five companies to terminate their pricing arrangements
with Apple and to avoid, for two years, entering into any contract
with an electronic book retailer in which the publisher asserted
control over book pricing.167 Though ostensibly intended to break up
an anti-competitive pricing arrangement, the Justice Department’s
160. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. Id.; HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 463.
162. HathiTrust, 902 F.Supp.2d at 463.
163. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). After granting
initial approval to the settlement, the court reversed course—following three years of
negotiations—on grounds it would “give Google a significant advantage over competitors,
rewarding it for engaging in wholesale copying of copyrighted works without permission.” Id. at
669.
164. United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Authors Guild
charged that the Department of Justice’s initial settlement with three of the publishers would
restore a “status quo” that previously allowed Amazon to claim 90 percent of the online
bookselling market through “predatory pricing.” Court Approves Justice Department’s E-Book
Proposal, Restoring pre-2010 Status Quo Without an Economic Study, AUTHORS GUILD
(Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.authorsguild.org/2012/09/.
165. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 623.
166. Id. at 627. All five publishers eventually settled with the government. Bob Van Voris,
Apple Denies Conspiring with Publishers in E-Books Trial, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2013,
9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-20/apple-denies-conspiring-with-publishers
-in-e-books-trial.html. Apple announced that it would appeal the consent decree, and continued as
the sole defendant. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 643.
167. Apple, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 629.
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action was widely seen as benefiting the largest electronic
bookseller, Amazon, and damaging publishers’ ability to assert
control over development of the e-book market.168 The Authors
Guild’s public statement on the settlement called attention to the
weakened state of two traditional sets of commodifiers—the
publishers themselves and “brick-and-mortar” bookstores—and the
strength of Amazon, which represented the new type of commodifier
that had originated in the digital environment.169 As a membership
organization representing authors, the Guild’s concern was
understandable: publishers might not always act in authors’ best
interests, but at least the two parties’ interests were inextricably
bound. Amazon, in contrast, had no direct relationship with authors
and was looking out for Amazon alone. Once publishers and other
traditional commodifiers ceded control of their side of the Copyright
Triangle to entitles such as Google and Amazon, authors would exert
even less control over their intellectual output—or even its value.
The twin copyright-duration rulings in Eldred and Golan had
confirmed the novel principle that one of the Copyright Clause’s
primary goals was the “dissemination” of authored works—not
necessarily with the additional goals of compensating authors for
their creativity or expanding consumers’ access to cultural wealth.
These rulings did not, however, anticipate the combined effect that
lengthened copyright durations might have once Google and
Amazon—and other commodifiers whose main business was
dissemination—began to subsume the place of traditional content
providers in the Copyright Triangle. Although Napster had failed to
find a way to commodify copyrighted works without infringement,
Google and Amazon appeared poised to succeed. A new set of
commodifiers, born in an era of megabytes rather than printing
presses, had allied themselves with consumers reared under the
mantra of “Information Wants to be Free.”170 It remained to authors
168. See Dawn C. Chmielewski & Carolyn Kellog, E-book settlement has publishing world in
turmoil, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/08/business/la-fi-ctebooks-20120908. Jonathan Kirsch, a Los Angeles intellectual property attorney and author, told
the newspaper that “[i]n terms of the real-life experiences of publishers, authors, and readers, this
will represent a fundamental change in how books are published and sold.” Id.
169. See AUTHORS GUILD, supra note 164.
170. See Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? and Other
Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 756–58 (2003) (explaining consumers’
discontent with the copyright system due to its complexity or because they object to the way
“copyright industries have successfully commoditized culture”).
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to see if there was still some way to adjust copyright protections to
serve them in this new era.
IV. WHAT TO DO
As discussed in Part III, the rise of Google and other digital
information commodifiers did not occur because of changes in
copyright law, such as CTEA’s extension of copyright terms. But
their arrival did come about just as CTEA, confirmed by Eldred and
Golan, made profound changes in copyright duration that benefited
the older class of information commodifiers. Now that the newer
class of commodifiers had arrived and found a willing audience of
consumers who were happy to share books, songs, and movies in
new ways (even if it meant infringing copyrights), traditional content
providers, such as book publishers, found their interests potentially
compromised, yet seemed unable to react except defensively.171
HathiTrust and the Justice Department’s settlement with the book
publishers in the Apple price-fixing litigation seemed to suggest the
beginning of the end of the traditional structures these older
companies had used to bring creative works to market.
Although authors had always been uneasy allies with the
companies that controlled their access to consumers,172 they had to
wonder whether these imperfect but functional alliances could serve
them much longer. And consumers, frustrated with traditional pricing
structures for published works, found ways to get access to them for
free.173
No further adjustment to copyright duration could, alone, be
expected to return market conditions to those that existed before the
Internet redefined consumers’ access to information and intellectual
property. But the Framers chose duration as the Copyright Clause’s
principal mechanism.174 Therefore, it remains to be considered
whether some new adjustments to duration, born in an era in which
the printing press has given way to digital transmission, may better
allow the Copyright Act to meet the Clause’s constitutional
171. See WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 24−25 (2009) (“The
Internet has ended the ability of copyright owners to deny consumers their preferences, but rather
than make money by satisfying them, copyright owners have resorted to litigation and
technological locks to thwart them. Myopia appears to be, in their case, a congenital disease.”).
172. Id.
173. See Madison, supra note 170, at 756−58.
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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imperative—whether that imperative is seen as fostering creativity,
compensating authors, or building a flourishing public domain.
This Part proposes two changes to copyright duration that may
help authors to navigate this new landscape on their own, without
concern for their traditional allies in the older content industries. One
proposed change would strengthen authors’ ability to divorce their
work from grantees, such as book publishers, to which they
temporarily assign their rights. It would do this by revising the 1976
Copyright Act to allow authors to reclaim their rights more quickly
than is currently permitted by statute: thirty-five to forty years,
depending on whether the grant includes publication rights.175 Thus
the author would be able to enjoy the balance of the copyright term
unencumbered by a grant he or she had earlier made to a book
publisher or other corporate entity. The second proposal would be to
return durations for certain kinds of works (notably books) to much
shorter terms: perhaps periods very like the fourteen-year term,
renewable once, that was enshrined in the original Copyright Act of
1790.176 Though admittedly difficult to implement, both because
copyright durations have consistently increased over time and
because of harmonization of copyright laws under international
regimes such as TRIPS, a reduction in copyright durations for certain
kinds of works would meet the needs of the digital era, in which
information may be disseminated rapidly, without printing presses
and archaic distribution channels. The combined effect of these
adjustments would be to keep creative works actively on sale rather
than consigned to obscurity, benefiting the author for as long as he or
she controlled the rights but benefiting the public by moving works
into the public domain more quickly.
A. Reduce the Time Authors Must Wait to
Recapture Their Rights
For the first century and a half of American copyright law,
authors who granted some or all of their rights to third parties—for
175. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)(2006). For grants of rights made after January 1, 1978, Congress
specified that copyright owners could effect termination during a five-year window that began
thirty-five years after the execution of the grant. In the case of publishing contracts, the
termination clock began running thirty-five years after publication or forty years from execution
of the grant, whichever was sooner. For works published prior to January 1, 1978, the termination
provision, similar to that in § 203(a), appears in § 304(c).
176. 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
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example, book or sheet music publishers—were reasonably assured
of being able to reclaim those rights in a timely fashion.177 The
relative ease of reclamation came about through a structure that had
always been part of the Copyright Act: the renewal term.178 Thus, for
example, if an author in 1920 granted a book publisher the exclusive
right to publish his or her novel, under provisions of the 1909
Copyright Act, his or her successors retained the ability to reclaim
the granted rights when it came time to renew the copyright after the
initial twenty-eight-year term.179 This was because the author was the
only party empowered to renew the copyright.180
Even while renewal terms still existed, prior to passage of the
1976 Copyright Act, book and music publishers found ways to
circumvent the rights-reclamation process by having authors
contractually grant their renewal rights to the publisher.181 Congress
had considered but abandoned proposals to match copyright duration
to Berne’s “life plus 50” regime as it framed the 1909 Copyright
Act.182 It instead retained the renewal structure specifically in order
to allow authors to reclaim their rights.183 “It not infrequently
happens that the author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for
a comparatively small sum,” the Committee on Patents told the
House of Representatives.184 “If the work proves to be a great
success and lives beyond the term of twenty-eight years, . . . it should
be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term.”185
Despite this unambiguous expression of congressional intent, in
1943 the Supreme Court unexpectedly interpreted the 1909 Act to
allow authors to assign their renewal rights contractually.186 To

177. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright Law’s Inalienable
Right to Terminate Transfers, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227, 227 (2010).
178. Id. at 228.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 227.
182. H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 14 (1909).
183. Id. at 15–16.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id.
186. Fred Fischer Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943) (holding that the
author of the song “When Irish Eyes Are Smiling” had irrevocably transferred his renewal
interest, not just his publishing rights, when he signed a publishing contract with a sheet music
company).

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

2014]

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

10/19/2014 10:51 AM

763

prevent any future question that the renewal interest was inalienable,
Congress made this an explicit provision of the 1976 Act.187
However, the 1976 Act also fundamentally altered the
mechanism for reclaiming rights by doing away with copyright
renewal; after January 1, 1978, copyright in most works would be
defined by a single term, equal to the life of the author plus fifty
years.188 To allow authors to reclaim rights granted to third parties
before the end of such a long period, Congress had to add a provision
providing for reclamation.189 As early as 1961, the United States
Copyright Office, already investigating revisions to the 1909 Act,
had recommended that Congress adopt a blanket twenty-year
limitation on copyright assignments as well as a provision allowing
authors to terminate unremunerative grants.190 By the time the 1976
Act was adopted, however, the automatic termination provision was
gone (as was the ability to terminate on the basis of insufficient
royalty income) and Congress had set the threshold for reclamation
at thirty-five years.191 This provision was carried over when CTEA
extended copyright durations by a further twenty years, despite
recommendations by some copyright experts to allow authors and
their heirs to reclaim their rights for the extension period.192
As noted above, the grant termination provision (embodied in
the 1976 Act and retained under CTEA) allows authors to terminate
grants of rights thirty-five to forty years after the date of the grant.193
That is too long. It was in the debates leading to passage of the 1976
Act that Justice Breyer, then teaching at Harvard Law School,
analyzed Congressional Research Service figures and found that only
1 percent of published works remained in print after fifty-six
years.194 There is little reason to suppose that many more works
remain in print after thirty-five or forty years. The award-winning
British novelist Julian Barnes recently asserted, “Nowadays, the
187. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 228.
188. Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 Stat.
2541, 2572–73 (1976).
189. Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 229.
190. Id. at 228–29.
191. Id. Menell and Nimmer term the debates on this provision “quite spirited.” Id.
192. See, e.g., William F. Patry, The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Or How
Publishers Managed to Steal the Bread from Authors, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 661, 688
(1996).
193. Id. at 685.
194. Breyer, supra note 122, at 324.
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average shelf-life of a new hardback novel—assuming it can reach a
shelf in the first place—is four months.”195 Judging by recent
industry statistics, the time in which printed works become
obsolescent is only accelerating. For example, recent U.S. book
publishing industry statistics show that unit sales of printed and
bound books declined 9 percent in 2012, on par with declines for
each of the previous two years.196 It is clear that traditional
publishing industry sales and marketing methods—tied to physical
bookstores that are themselves in retreat—are no longer adequate to
help authors reach consumers any more than traditional music stores
are adequate to help composers and musicians market their own
work. Yet in most book publishing contracts, authors grant
publishers exclusive rights to publish in book and derivative forms
“for the full term of copyright,” locking up a complete package of
subsidiary rights (including paperback editions, electronic books,
translations, excerpts, audio recordings, and in many cases, even
television and film rights) for at least the full thirty-five years until
termination becomes possible.197 The situation is similar in the music
business where, traditionally, “very few corporations” acquire
copyrights in songs from individual songwriters and musical groups,
benefiting from authors’ inability to terminate grants they made in
essentially unequal negotiations.198
Some intellectual property scholars have suggested that, rather
than allowing authors to terminate grants of rights more rapidly,
Congress should consider new forms of regulation in authorpublisher contracts, since authors are in an inherently “weaker
bargaining position.”199 That seems to miss the point. Empowering
authors to reclaim rights in a more timely fashion will enable them to
find new ways to exploit works that might otherwise lie fallow in
publishers’ catalogs, years after most physical sales have taken place.
195. Julian Barnes, My Life as a Bibliophile, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2012, 5:55 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/jun/29/my-life-as-bibliophile-julian-barnes.
196. Jim Milliot, Rate of Print Decline Flattened in 2012, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/bookselling/article
/55382-rate-of-print-decline-flattened-in-2012.html.
197. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 5-26 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 26.03
(2012) (template for a “typical book publishing agreement”).
198. See Patry, supra note 192, at 662–63.
199. Lionel Bently & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors":
Anglo-American Authors' Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S.
Copyright, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1586–87 (2010).
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Ultimately, authors, as creators of written, visual, and musical works
and as individuals attempting to look after their own careers and
reputations, have the greatest stake in making sure that their works
reach the public and provide a healthy livelihood. In order to protect
the value of agreements that book publishers, music labels, and other
corporate entities entered with authors in good faith, a revised
termination provision could and should resurrect the Copyright
Office’s 1961 proposal: provide for the early termination of
“unremunerative” grants.200 Copyright would remain in force but
control would revert to the author. Congress could set financial or
unit-sales criteria to help determine when a grantee had exhausted all
likelihood of substantial further sales, triggering reclamation of
rights by the author. Thus, even if copyright duration continued for
the extremely long terms imposed by CTEA, authors would stand a
chance of recovering and reinvigorating works grantees had long
since stopped exploiting. They would also be in a position to police
the exploitation of their rights in the online environment.
B. Apply Shorter, Not Longer, Copyright Terms
to Certain Kinds of Works
The Copyright Act of 1790 protected “the authors and
proprietors” of maps, charts and books printed in the United
States.201 With time, works in more media received protection,
including engravings, etchings, and prints (1802) and musical
compositions (1831).202 Congress protected photographs and their
negatives in 1865.203 One impetus for passage of the 1909 Copyright
Act was the then recent invention of the phonograph and the need “to
protect the composer against the unlicensed use of his music in these
mechanical instruments.”204 Just three years later, the invention of
the motion picture required Congress to act again, adding movies to
copyright protection.205

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Menell & Nimmer, supra note 177, at 229.
Copyright Act, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
McDonald, supra note 126, at 547.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012).
S. REP. NO. 59-6187, at 3 (1907).
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 892.

COPYRIGHT’S VICIOUS TRIANGLE

766

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

10/19/2014 10:51 AM

[Vol. 47:731

Copyright duration, however, is uniform without reference to the
medium of the work in question.206 That is true in the Copyright Act
of 1976, as amended by CTEA in 1998,207 just as it was true in the
Copyright Act of 1909.208 One reason for this uniformity may have
been “the relative homogeneity of market conditions applicable to
protected subject matter,” particularly when the Copyright Clause
protected relatively few kinds of works.209 However, one has only to
look to the legislative history of CTEA, and other recent adjustments
to copyright statutes, to see that some media industries and
intellectual property rights interest groups have greater lobbying
capabilities than others.210 Indeed, it may have been inevitable that
an industry responsible for “more than $4 billion in surplus balance
of trade,” as the movie and television industry’s representative told
the Senate committee considering CTEA in 1995, placed such a
premium on extending copyright durations to match those in force in
the European Union.211
However, it is also the case that “innovators’ needs for
intellectual property protection vary substantially across industries
and among types of innovation.”212 Some experts in the economics
of intellectual property reason that when rights are “more or less
robust than necessary” to induce innovation, the resulting distortions,
measured by interference with distribution, exact a “social cost.”213
Such distortions may arise for reasons of both the scope and duration
of rights, particularly when these factors are made uniform rather
than tailored to “differences in functionality and expressiveness in
patentable and copyrightable subject matter.”214 Copyright duration
in the United States has always been uniform across all forms of
intellectual property, even though the Copyright Act was initially
206. Copyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998) (“Copyright in a work created
on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following
subsections, endures for a term consisting of life of the author and 70 years after the author’s
death.”).
207. Id.
208. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909).
209. Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846 (2006).
210. Senate Hearing, supra note 92 (in which, as noted earlier, testimony by the president of
the Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, was arguably the most prominent).
211. Id. at 42 (Prepared Statement of Jack Valenti).
212. Carroll, supra note 209, at 847.
213. Id. at 849.
214. Id. at 862.
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interpreted to apply to works in only a handful of media.215 Thus,
there is a historical tradition for uniform duration; and, in recent
years, U.S. adherence to international intellectual property regimes
like Berne and TRIPS has confirmed the status quo attitude toward
uniformity.216 In effect, the U.S. is now seemingly locked into a
degree of durational uniformity imposed from beyond its borders,
with relatively little discretion left to manage the attendant costs.217
However, the United States could, and should, elect to lobby for
change at an international level. The Berne Convention’s “life plus
50” durational structure is virtually uniform across all works.218
However, Berne was born in a European civil law context that had
always emphasized the idea of “authors’ rights,” emphasizing the
idea of creative works as an extension of the author’s intellect.219
That is a fundamentally different conception of authorship than the
utilitarian model, with its emphasis of tradeoffs between the author’s
practical need to earn a living and the public’s need for a thriving
public domain, which has predominated in the United States.220
Arguably, the Internet’s arrival and its ability to disseminate works
more quickly is reason enough to question the continued validity of
the authors’ rights model as the basis for rigid conceptions of
copyright duration.
The public’s embrace of the “information wants to be free”
model imperils the view that authors will always be perceived as the
“good guys,” small-time artists who deserve to earn a living
providing books, songs, photographs, and other works of creative
expression for an adoring public. So long as authors are perceived as
using copyright to “enclose” the information commons, Internetbased information disseminators such as Google can be cast as
intellectual Robin Hoods, liberating information that had selfishly
215. Id. at 846–47; see also Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884)
(noting that the Copyright Act of 1790 was initially interpreted to apply only to maps, charts, and
books); and Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 892 (2012) (providing dates when Congress
extended copyright protection to additional categories of works).
216. Carroll, supra note 209, at 875.
217. Id. at 878.
218. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works arts. 3 & 7, July 24,
1971, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. As Berne was originally framed, interestingly,
photographs and “works of applied art” were exempted from the “life plus 50” rule, though a
minimum term of twenty-five years applied. Id. art. 7.
219. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 57–58 (8th ed. 2010).
220. See Nachbar, supra note 47, at 39–40.
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been guarded by greedy authors and their purported allies, the oldstyle content providers (publishers, movie studios, record labels, and
so forth) that stand to gain from reduced dissemination and increased
prices.
One way to combat this perception is to roll back copyright
durational periods that impose social costs but can find no basis in
financial reality for authors or even for content providers. At a time
when information becomes obsolescent with astonishing speed and
the public seems to adopt and overthrow “favorite” forms of
entertainment with abandon, the case can be made that very few
creative works have any business remaining under copyright for the
life of the author plus seventy years or, for that matter, for terms
even nearly approaching such lengthy durations.
As Congress heard at hearings that preceded the 1909 Copyright
Act—and as it heard again in the years leading up to the 1976 Act,
including from the young Stephen Breyer—the vast majority of
published works cease earning revenues for their authors within their
first three decades of existence. If Julian Barnes is correct, most
contemporary novels may achieve their entire shelf life within
months of publication. Thus, copyright durations that served the
nation in 1790 may once again be timely for certain kinds of
works—especially books. Reducing durations to fourteen years,
renewable once for fourteen years more, may be a perfectly sensible
response to the new marketplace of ideas, where books and other
creative works can be transmitted from creator to consumer in mere
seconds, without need of printing presses, warehousing, physical
shipment, and “brick-and-mortar” retail stores. However, Hollywood
movies, which may take years and millions of dollars to develop and
the resources of major motion picture studios and production
companies to realize and exploit, may continue to require the “life
plus 50” duration that Berne enshrined and CTEA extended.
Now that the United States adheres to international treaties that
impose long copyright durations and has ample reason to protect its
intellectual property industries from retaliatory trade practices of
other countries, it is constrained from imposing unilateral solutions
to its own copyright dilemmas. But even if international regimes are
cumbersome to negotiate, the transformation of technology demands
replacement of Gutenberg-era copyright practices with customs and
formalities that will serve a new age. The United States should begin
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to set the stage for modernized and rationalized international regimes
that will decouple creative works in each medium, and consider the
scope and duration of protections that will best serve each one as
well as the creators who depend on producing such works for their
livelihoods and the consuming public.
V. CONCLUSION
Against the backdrop of the Internet, information and even art
age more rapidly. No longer dependent on creaky distribution
channels such as paper newspapers and magazines, printed and
bound books sold in stores, and vinyl records sold in stores, works of
authorship may travel to market far more quickly—but may also live
out their lives much more rapidly. Now that consumers may read
books, watch movies, and listen to music on their mobile phones as
well as in their living rooms, it is easy to see how information moves
at a faster pace than ever before. It is no longer sensible to imagine
that information commodifiers can or should require decades to
recoup their expenses in marketing and selling creative works that
were, after all, the fruits of someone else’s labors.
A more impressionistic rationale for copyright reform may be
added to the substantive reasons for restoring authors’ control over
their own work in the digital era: doing so might remind consumers
that they have more in common with authors than with large
commodifiers. If authors were decoupled from the media
conglomerates that have controlled their creative output for so long,
a generation of consumers raised under the “information wants to be
free” ethic might think twice before downloading copyrightprotected works from the Internet without compensating the works’
creators. Reducing copyright durations—and allowing authors to
reclaim their rights more quickly—might also allow authors to
exploit their works more creatively, again fashioning a more
productive and meaningful partnership between them and consumers.
The result will be a more robust information commons, and a more
rational, equilateral, Copyright Triangle.
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